Balancing Conflicting Security Interests: U.S. Defense Exports to China in the Last Decade of the Cold War by Meijer, Hugo
Balancing Conflicting Security Interests
U.S. Defense Exports to China in the Last
Decade of the Cold War
✣ Hugo Meijer
Introduction
From 1949 until the U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s, the bilat-
eral relationship between Washington and Beijing was fraught with strategic
distrust. After the Korean War began in 1950, the United States imposed a
strict embargo against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and urged West
European countries and Japan to introduce similar controls on exports to the
PRC. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the United States was more willing
than its allies to implement tight restrictions on trade with China. Indeed,
U.S. controls on strategic trade with China during this time were more strin-
gent than those imposed against the Soviet Union. The harsher export control
treatment of China relative to the Soviet Union came to be known as the
“China Differential.”1 The disparity reflected the U.S. perception at the time
that the PRC was the single greatest security threat to U.S. interests in East
Asia because of what U.S. officials perceived as aggressive Chinese foreign
policy behavior in the region and Mao’s commitment to sponsor, support, and
direct wars of national liberation.2 U.S. officials also believed that the “China
1. In 1957, in light of the perceived receding security concerns over China after the end of the Korean
War, Western Europe, led by Great Britain, abandoned the differential and decided to treat the USSR
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) equally. The United States, by contrast, wanted to retain the
differential, fearing that a relaxation of controls would contribute to the growth of China’s economic
and military capabilities. The United States continued to impose a unilateral “China Differential”
until the Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s. See Shu Guang Zhang, Economic Cold
War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963 (Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), ch. 7.
2. See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, The China Threat: Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012); and William Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of
Sino-American Relations, 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 206–214.
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Differential,” by forcing Beijing to depend overwhelmingly on Moscow’s aid,
could strain the relationship and contribute to the emerging Sino-Soviet split.3
Starting in the 1970s, with the U.S.-China rapprochement under Pres-
ident Richard Nixon, Washington made the first gestures to loosen the re-
strictions on bilateral trade. The Nixon administration abolished the “China
Differential” and put in place a policy of “evenhandedness,” which meant that
the United States would allow exports to the PRC of technologies similar to
those permitted to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But in the aftermath
of the establishment of full U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations in late 1979 and
especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, China
and the United States gradually forged a strategic cooperation based on mili-
tary exchanges, intelligence-sharing, and technology transfers. This pro-China
“tilt” marked a shift in U.S. export control policy toward the establishment of
a new “China Differential”—but one that, unlike the differential in the 1950s,
was in favor of Beijing at the expense of Moscow.
This article investigates the bifurcation in U.S. export control policy to-
ward the PRC and the Soviet Union in the last decade of the Cold War.
Specifically, it seeks to explain the rationale and evolution of U.S. defense
exports to China in the 1980s and the abrupt collapse of U.S.-China military
cooperation in 1989. On the one hand, Washington imposed increasingly
stringent national and multilateral export controls against the USSR in order
to preserve a qualitative gap between Soviet and U.S. state-of-the-art defense
technologies. On the other hand, the United States gradually loosened con-
trols on exports of armaments and dual-use goods to China. The tightening
of Western export controls on the Soviet Union coupled with a major liberal-
ization of controls on defense-related exports to the PRC steadily broadened
the “China Differential” throughout the 1980s. Although the United States
increased the flow of defense technology exports to the PRC in a triangular
diplomatic game aimed at counterbalancing the USSR, the volume and quality
of these transfers were carefully calibrated to avoid bolstering China’s offensive
capabilities vis-a`-vis U.S. friends and allies in the region. This preferential
export control treatment for China relative to that of the USSR lasted until
the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the subsequent U.S. sanctions, and
the end of the Cold War.
A voluminous literature has surveyed U.S. export controls toward the
Soviet Union, as well as the chief multilateral institution governing East-
West strategic trade during the Cold War, the Coordinating Committee for
3. See Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1995), ch. 3. On this point, see also Zhang, Economic Cold War.
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Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).4 U.S. restrictions on technology
transfers and trade with the PRC in the first decades of the Cold War period
have also been the subject of works by both historians and political scientists.5
The most detailed account of the U.S.-led embargo against China from the late
1940s to the early 1960s is Shu Guang Zhang’s Economic Cold War: America’s
Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963. Drawing on
documents from the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, the
archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, and the Chinese provincial archives,
it traces the origins and development of the Western embargo on China in the
early Cold War period.
In contrast, fewer studies have specifically focused on U.S.-China military
relations in the 1980s, and the existing literature overwhelmingly relies on
secondary sources. This is the case with works by Tan Qingshan, Eden Woon,
Larry Wortzel, and Jing-Dong Yuan on U.S. technology transfers to the PRC.6
Furthermore, the extant studies tend to gloss over the heterogeneous and
4. See, among others, Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare, 1947–1967: A Case Study in
Foreign Economic Policy (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968); Gary K. Bertsch, ed.,Controlling East-
West Trade and Technology Transfer: Power, Politics, and Policies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1988); Gary Bertsch, East-West Strategic Trade: COCOM, and the Atlantic Alliance (Paris: Atlantic
Institute for International Affairs, 1983); Philip Hanson, Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Ian Jackson, The Economic Cold War. America,
Britain and East-West Trade, 1948–63 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Michael Mastanduno,
Economic Containment: COCOM and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1992); and Bruce Parrott, ed., Trade, Technology, and Soviet-American Relations (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1982).
5. See, among others, Frank Cain, “The U.S.-Led Trade Embargo on China: The Origins of
CHINCOM, 1947–1952,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 33–54;
Frank Cain, “Computers and the Cold War: United States Restrictions on the Export of Computers
to the Soviet Union and Communist China,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January
2005), pp. 131–147; Foot, The Practice of Power, ch. 3; Jackson, The Economic Cold War, pp. 148–154;
and Zhang, Economic Cold War.
6. Qingshan Tan, The Making of U.S. China Policy: From Normalization to the Post–Cold War Era
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), chs. 4–5; Eden Woon, “Chinese Arms Sales and U.S.-China
Military Relations,”Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 6 (1989), pp. 601–618; Larry Wortzel, “U.S. Technology
Transfer Policies and the Modernization of China’s Armed Forces,” Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 6 (1987),
pp. 615–637; and Jing-Dong Yuan, “The Politics of the Strategic Triangle: The U.S., COCOM,
and Export Controls on China, 1979–1989,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1
(1995), pp. 47–79. In addition, a few articles in law journals have reported the evolution of U.S.
administrative regulations on export controls toward China throughout the Cold War. See Luke Lee
and John McCobb, “United States Trade Embargo on China, 1949–1970: Legal Status and Future
Prospects,”NewYorkUniversity Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1971), pp. 9–10;
John McKenzie, “China and U.S. Trade: Recent Export Regulations,” International Lawyer, Vol. 18,
No. 2 (1984), pp. 455–464; Madelyn Ross, “China and the United States’ Export Controls System,”
Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1986), pp. 27–33; and John Yo-Hwan Lee, “The
1983 Amendment to the Export Administration Regulations: The Status of Export Controls to the
People’s Republic of China,” Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 6, No. 4
(1984), pp. 1096–1120.
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conflicting national security interests that shaped U.S. export control policy in
the last decade of the Cold War. Jing-Dong Yuan, for instance, seeks to explain
the development of and rationale behind the “China Differential” in the 1980s
by tracing the origin of U.S. technology transfers to China in the military
dynamics of the strategic triangle: the “‘China Card’ would be played to recast
the balance of [military] power in Washington’s favor” vis-a`-vis the Soviet
Union.7 Yet, besides this key objective, Yuan does not account for the other
U.S. national security interests at stake in the U.S.-PRC military relationship,
such as the likely consequences of defense exports to China for U.S. friends
and allies in Northeast and Southeast Asia. The most thorough analysis of the
negotiations over the formation of U.S.-China strategic cooperation from the
Sino-American rapprochement to the late 1980s is Robert Ross’s Negotiating
Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989, which relies on public
speeches, memoirs of policymakers, contemporaneous newspaper articles, and
interviews with U.S. officials.8 Ross offers a subtle and nuanced account of the
main drivers of and obstacles to Sino-American military cooperation in the
1970s and 1980s. However, even though he draws on declassified materials
when covering the 1970s, the documents he uses when analyzing U.S.-China
security cooperation in the early to mid-1980s are mainly secondary sources.9
Furthermore, Ross largely slights U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation in the latter
half of the 1980s and the key U.S. decisions that affected military cooperation
with China from 1985 to the Tiananmen Square crackdown.10
By relying on a large body of new written and oral primary sources,
this article builds on but goes beyond the existing literature to enrich our
understanding of this strategically important yet underexplored dimension of
U.S.-China relations in the last decade of the Cold War. In particular, contrary
to what is often assumed in the literature, the article shows that Washington’s
assessment of the required degree of defense cooperation with Beijing was not
driven solely by the objective of using the “China card” against the Soviet
Union. A broader range of national security considerations shaped U.S. pol-
icy on military cooperation with the PRC, namely, the desire not to enhance
China’s offensive capabilities vis-a`-vis the United States and U.S. friends and al-
lies in East Asia (Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and others),
7. Jing-Dong Yuan, “The Politics of the Strategic Triangle,” p. 47.
8. Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1995).
9. Ibid., chs. 6–7.
10. The same critique can be directed at Harry Harding’s A Fragile Relationship: The United States and
China since 1972 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1992).
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the impact of defense transfers to China on U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations,
and the goal of influencing China’s nuclear proliferation practices, especially
in the Middle East. As a consequence, the U.S. government needed to manage
and balance multiple and diverging national security interests and faced deli-
cate tradeoffs in its military relationship with the PRC throughout the decade.
These facets of U.S.-China security cooperation have been largely neglected in
the existing literature on the subject. The article therefore examines the main
decisions that marked the rise and fall of Sino-American strategic relations
in the 1980s on the basis of a wide range of recently declassified documents
stored at the National Security Archive, congressional hearings, and interviews
with 39 individuals who served on the U.S. National Security Council (NSC)
staff or at the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce and helped to
formulate U.S. export control policy toward China in the 1980s.11
From Rapprochement to 1980: The Origins
of U.S.-China Military Cooperation
The considerations that spurred the Nixon administration to move toward a
rapprochement with the PRC were primarily strategic. President Nixon’s short-
term objective was to facilitate an end to the Vietnam War by isolating Hanoi
from one of its principal supporters, the PRC, and thereby bringing pressure
on North Vietnam to adopt a more conciliatory posture.12 In the longer run,
taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split, a strategic partnership with China
could increase U.S. leverage in relations with the USSR and encourage restraint
in Moscow’s foreign policy. The United States and China increasingly came to
see each other, in the words of Henry Kissinger, as “tacit allies.”13 But after a
modest liberalization of trade controls in the early 1970s, the improvement of
11. The declassified documents on U.S. export control policy toward China were found in the following
collections of the National Security Archive (NSArchive): China and the United States: From Hostility
to Engagement, 1960–1998 (hereinafter China and the United States); U.S. Intelligence and China:
Collection, Analysis, and Covert Action (hereinafter U.S. Intelligence and China); Japan and the United
States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1960–1976 (hereinafter Japan and the United
States); National Security Agency—Organization and Operations, 1945–2009 (hereinafter National
Security Agency).
12. On the Sino-American rapprochement see, among others, Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S.
Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit Ally’ (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
13. The White House, “My Trip to China,” Top Secret, Memorandum from National Security Adviser
Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon, 2 March 1973, in NSArchive, Japan and the United
States.
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U.S.-PRC relations slowed in the mid-1970s. Domestically, the two countries
experienced leadership succession crises with the death of Zhou Enlai and Mao
Zedong in 1976 and the Watergate scandal in the United States that resulted
in Nixon’s resignation under pressure in 1974. Furthermore, the policy of
de´tente with the Soviet Union under both Nixon and his successor, Gerald R.
Ford, made U.S. officials reluctant to foster security cooperation in a way that
would antagonize the USSR.
After Jimmy Carter became president, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance fa-
vored the continuation of “evenhandedness” in technology exports to Beijing
and Moscow, fearing that enhanced security cooperation with China might be
perceived as too provocative and detrimental to U.S.-Soviet relations.14 Vance
wanted to revive de´tente with the Soviet Union and to agree with Moscow
on a strategic arms limitation treaty. In contrast, Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski gave higher priority
to bolstering the U.S. strategic relationship with China so that it would become
a permanent part of Moscow’s calculations: Soviet leaders should come to be-
lieve that aggressive Soviet moves abroad would reinforce U.S.-China military
cooperation.15 Brzezinski strongly opposed Vance’s “evenhanded” policy and
forcefully pushed for U.S.-PRC security cooperation.16 Until December 1979,
however, Carter continued to support Vance’s views and to pursue a policy of
“evenhandedness” toward China and the Soviet Union.
The establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 sparked the inception of U.S.-China
military cooperation that lasted until 1989. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
prompted Carter to adopt an export control policy that distinctly favored the
PRC at the expense of the USSR—the so-called pro-China “tilt”—as advocated
by Brzezinski.17
Secretary of Defense Brown’s visit to the PRC in January 1980—the first
such visit by a U.S. defense secretary—was not originally intended to establish
military cooperation between the two countries. Brown had been instructed
by the president that no military cooperation would take place, but in the
aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the guidelines for Brown’s
14. Robert Sutter, The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy, 1972–1982
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 7.
15. Michel Oksenberg, “A Decade of Sino-American Relations,”Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Summer
1982), p. 190.
16. Sutter, The China Quandary, p. 7.
17. Jonathan Pollack, The Lessons from Coalition Politics: Sino-American Security Relations (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1984), pp. 46–47.
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visit were modified to seek broader strategic cooperation with China.18 On 4
January 1980, just a few hours before Brown’s departure for Beijing, Carter
authorized the sale of nonlethal military equipment to China.19 Brown then
followed up with the launch of military relations between the United States
and the PRC. During the eight-day visit, the two governments agreed to initi-
ate regular exchanges of high-ranking U.S. and Chinese military officials and
working-level military delegations.20 The two countries also strengthened their
cooperation in intelligence sharing. The Pentagon provided the Chinese with
sensitive intelligence, including satellite imagery, on Soviet troop deployments
along the Soviet-Chinese border and established two stations on Chinese
territory to monitor the nuclear tests and strategic nuclear deployments of the
Soviet Union.21 These stations in China partly filled the gap created by the
dismantlement of U.S. listening posts along the 1,200-mile Soviet-Iranian
border after the February 1979 revolution in Iran.22 Furthermore, as Winston
Lord, who served as U.S. ambassador to the PRC from 1985 to 1989, later
explained, “the CIA was doing two things: it was cooperating with the Chinese
in getting arms to Pakistan to send them to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan,
but at the same time the CIA was spying as best as it could against China as they
were spying on us. So it was a very ambivalent relationship.”23 An additional
element of U.S.-China defense cooperation discussed during Brown’s visit
was U.S. and Chinese military support for Pakistan and assistance to Afghan
rebels. The Chinese informed Brown that the PRC would increase the covert
supply of weaponry to the Afghan rebels, principally through Pakistan.24 The
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping told Brown that China and the United States
“should unite to oppose the Soviets” and “should turn Afghanistan into a
quagmire for the Soviets.”25 The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began
purchasing from the Chinese government assault rifles, grenade launchers,
18. Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 91.
19. Pollack, The Lessons from Coalition Politics, pp. 46–47.
20. Harding,A Fragile Relationship, p. 91. For a description of U.S.-China military-to-military relations
from 1979 to 1985, see U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, United States-China Military Relations,
1979–1985: Analysis and Chronology, Classification Unknown, Working Paper, 2 January 1986, in
NSArchive, China and the United States.
21. Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 92.
22. For details on these sites, see A Sourcebook on the TACKSMAN I and TACKSMAN II
ELINT Bases in Iran (2012), available on the website of the Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/tacksman.pdf.
23. Winston Lord, interview, New York, 22 April 2010.
24. Pollack, The Lessons from Coalition Politics, p. 54.
25. Richard Solomon, U.S.-PRC Political Negotiations, 1967–84: An Annotated Chronology, Secret,
RAND Corporation, 1985, p. 79, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
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mines, and SA-7 light anti-aircraft weapons, which were then shipped to
Pakistan; and the Chinese agreed to supply U.S.-made Stinger surface-to-air
missiles to Afghan rebels.26 The PRC also began to channel mortars, machine
guns, rocket launchers, and ammunition into Afghanistan on mules traversing
the Karakoram Highway.27 With regard to U.S. defense technology exports
to China, Brown during his visit “informed the Chinese of the President’s
decision of Friday, January 4, that [the U.S. was] now prepared to consider
sale of [nonlethal] military equipment, but not arms, to China on a carefully
selected case-by-case basis.”28 The following month, on 25 April 1980, the
administration modified dual-use exports controls by removing China from
the same category of export controls as the Soviet Union (“Country Group
Y”) and setting up a special category for the PRC known as “Country Group
P.” This shift in U.S. policy was in line with a request made more than a year
earlier by Deng during a visit to the United States, when he lamented that
China continued to be in the same Country Group as Moscow and urged that
the PRC be placed in a category labeled with another of the 26 letters in the
English alphabet.29 The administration initially made no change but by 1980
concluded that the “inclusion of China in Category Y with the Soviet Union
is an unnecessary irritant to our relations with China. Changing the name of
the category would not affect our policy on exports to China . . . nor would
it directly affect COCOM since this category is used only within the USG
[US government].”30 Country Group P and Country Group Y were identical
in their level of restrictiveness and licensing procedures.31 Nevertheless,
the creation of this China-specific group did signal a desire to differentiate
between the export control treatment of the PRC and of the USSR.
In the second half of 1980, U.S. export control policy toward China was
based on several principles: a willingness to consider, case-by-case, the transfer
26. See James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China from Nixon
to Clinton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), pp. 136–139; Steve Coll, “Anatomy of a Victory: CIA’s
Covert Afghan War,” TheWashington Post, 19 July 1992, pp. A1, A11; and Steve Coll, “In CIA’s Covert
Afghan War, Where to Draw the Line Was Key,” The Washington Post, 20 July 1992, p. A3.
27. Mann, About Face, p. 136.
28. U.S. Department of State, “Sales of Sensitive Equipment,” Top Secret, Memorandum from Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs Nicholas Platt, and Michael Oksenberg of the National
Security Council (NSC) Staff, to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown,
and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22 January 1980, in NSArchive, China and the
United States.
29. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, p. 149.
30. U.S. Department of State, “Technology Transfers and Military Equipment Sales to China,” 1980.
31. See Yo-Hwan Lee, “The 1983 Amendment to the Export Administration Regulations,” p. 1105
n. 73.
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of dual-use technology for military use; a willingness to consider, case-by-case,
the sale of nonlethal military equipment and technology; no authorization for
government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to China; restricting
shipments of dual-use and military support technology and equipment to those
that could be transacted commercially through export licensing; a continued
prohibition against sales of weapons systems; assurance to U.S. allies that
all military and dual-use technology sales to China would be coordinated
through existing COCOM machinery and a request that they do likewise;
and a neutral attitude toward sales of defensive weapons to China by third
countries.32
The Carter administration’s underlying rationale in taking this first step
toward enhanced U.S. technology transfers to China was the need to bal-
ance several conflicting national security interests. Economic considerations
at that time had little effect on U.S. export control policy. Indeed in 1980,
Sino-American trade amounted to only $4.8 billion.33 As explained by Donald
Keyser, who headed the political section at the U.S. embassy in Beijing respon-
sible for Chinese domestic issues in 1982–1983 and then served as deputy for
political, military, consular/asylum, and cultural affairs in the State Depart-
ment’s Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, the first objective in U.S.
export control toward the PRC “had little to do with economic or commercial
considerations. The basic consideration was strategic; the driving force was
overwhelmingly strategic, it had nothing to do with commercial factors.”34
The United States wanted to contribute to the technological modernization
of the PRC in the context of the strategic triangle, playing the “China card”
against the USSR.
This objective continued to drive U.S. policy after Ronald Reagan was
inaugurated as U.S. president in January 1981. A declassified Department of
Defense memorandum from 1981 stresses that
China is important to the U.S. as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet
Union. . . . The Chinese tie down 47 Divisions along the 3,000 miles Sino-
Mongolian-Soviet border. About 25% of the Soviet defense effort, or $40 bil-
lion annually, is devoted to counter the direct Chinese threat. . . . The strategic
32. U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Sales to China,” Secret, Memorandum for Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Franklin Kramer, 23 February 1981,
in NSArchive, China and the United States.
33. U.S. International Trade Commission (USTIC), Interactive Tariff and Trade Database, available
at http://dataweb.usitc.gov.
34. Donald Keyser, interview, Washington, DC, 8 May 2010.
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objectives of U.S. policy to the PRC should be to: maintain, and if possible, en-
hance China’s military value as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union.35
Similarly, Stephen Bryen, a senior U.S. Defense Department official under
Reagan, later explained that the United States
had to engage China in order to balance off Soviet power. In those days, Soviet
forces also had the task of confronting China. Across the border, the Russians
had large installations facing the Chinese. So the idea was that if we could use
China as a foil, it would tie down Soviet forces and essentially reduce the impact
on NATO of the Soviet military buildup by requiring the Soviets to deploy some
of their forces facing China.36
However, the Reagan administration also wanted to keep careful track
of the potential national security consequences of different export control
policy options on U.S.- Soviet diplomatic relations: “any change [in U.S. ex-
port control policy] which would result in the sale of weapons technology or
weapons systems to the Chinese would inevitably lead to heightened Soviet
concerns vis-a`-vis China’s military capabilities. . . . There is concern that we
not move so far with the Chinese that we reduce prospects for improving
U.S.- Soviet relations.”37 A third U.S. security objective was a desire to avoid
the transfer of defense technologies that could enhance “Chinese capabilities
genuinely threatening to U.S. allies and friends in Asia.”38 Donald Keyser later
recalled that “from the U.S. standpoint, the concern was that the Chinese
did not acquire the capabilities that would enhance their offensive potential
vis-a`-vis Taiwan in particular, and other U.S. allies in the Pacific on the other
hand.”39 As Robert Ross has shown, the Taiwan issue limited the degree of
U.S.-PRC bilateral security cooperation throughout the decade.40 The 1979
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) stated that the United States would consider “any
effort to determine the nature of Taiwan by other than peaceful means” as “a
threat to the peace of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the
United States.” The TRA also declared that the United States would make
available to Taiwan “defense articles and defense services in such quantity
35. U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Sales to China,” 1981.
36. Stephen Bryen, interview, Washington, DC, 22 November 2010.
37. U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Sales to China,” 1981.
38. Ibid.
39. Donald Keyser, interview, Washington, DC, 18 May 2010. Keyser was chief of the political section
unit responsible for Chinese domestic issues in the U.S. embassy in Beijing (1982–1983) and then
deputy for political, military, consular/asylum, and cultural affairs in the State Department’s Office of
Chinese and Mongolian Affairs (1983–1985).
40. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, p. 114.
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as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.”41 Furthermore, several Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Indone-
sia, and South Korea, had expressed their concerns to the U.S. government
over its defense technology transfers to the PRC.42 The administration there-
fore considered that “a change in U.S. policy to permit arms sales to the
PRC would probably cause insurmountable problems in our relations with
the individual states” in East and Southeast Asia.43 On the basis of these latter
considerations, the U.S. government decided to continue to restrict technolo-
gies that would make a “direct and significant contribution” to four key areas:
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, electronic warfare, anti-submarine
warfare, and intelligence gathering.44
Twice as Much as the Soviet Union: The “Two-Times”
Policy and the Taiwan Conundrum
In 1981 and early 1982 the U.S.-PRC military relationship was temporarily
slowed by bilateral disagreements over Taiwan. After a presidential campaign
in which he had declared that he was in favor of resuming official relations
with the Taipei government, Reagan took office determined to improve U.S.-
Taiwan relations either through the restoration of official bilateral contacts
or through increased arms sales. At the same time, disagreements emerged
within the U.S. government over the course of U.S. policy toward Beijing and
Taipei.45 On the one hand, Reagan’s national security adviser, Richard Allen;
the director of policy planning at the State Department, Paul Wolfowitz; and
the chief NSC official overseeing Asian affairs, Gaston Sigur, shared the view
that although the U.S.-PRC relationship was important, the administration
should bolster relations with Taipei and sell arms to the island in conformity
with the TRA. On the other hand, Vice President George H. W. Bush, who
had been chief of the U.S. liaison office in the PRC in the mid-1970s, and
41. Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, 10 April 1979.
42. U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Sales to China,” 1981. Japan had expressed “no clear
consensus . . . except that any U.S. policy change should be preceded by formal consultations” with
Tokyo.
43. Ibid.
44. Henry Kenny, “Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China,” in U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers—1986 (Washington, DC:
ACDA, 1987), p. 61.
45. On the debates within the Reagan administration over U.S. “China policy,” see Cohen, America’s
Response to China, pp. 225–231; and Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, pp. 166–169.
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Secretary of State Alexander Haig advocated supporting Taiwan but in ways
that would not alienate Beijing. Haig, influenced by the triangular diplomacy
of Henry Kissinger—under whom he had worked in the Ford and Nixon
administrations in the 1970s—believed that the United States should subor-
dinate Sino-American disagreements over Taiwan to the strategic imperative
of improving cooperation with the PRC against the Soviet Union. Ultimately,
Bush and Haig were able to convince the president that a strategic partnership
with Beijing was necessary in the confrontation against the Soviet Union.46
The first high-level contact between the Reagan administration and Chi-
nese officials took place when Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China
on 14–17 June 1981 to meet with Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Defense
Minister Geng Biao, Deng Xiaoping, and Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang.47
A key objective of Haig’s visit was to convey “a new conceptual basis for a
more durable U.S.- Chinese relationship built upon strategic association, un-
der which the U.S. will treat China as a friendly non-allied country, and to
demonstrate this concretely by modifying the restrictive legislation and reg-
ulations on exports.”48 The major topics discussed by Haig and Huang on
the first day of the visit were Taiwan, the means to improve the coordination
of U.S. and Chinese policies in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, and U.S.
technology transfers to China.49 Haig informed the Chinese that the U.S.
government would treat the PRC as a “friendly non-aligned country” entitled
to receive increased U.S. technology transfers, and he affirmed Reagan’s desire
to suspend the prohibition on arms sales to China.50 Although FMS to China
were not yet allowed, the United States would henceforth permit the export
of lethal equipment on a case-by-case basis.
In late June 1981, shortly after Haig’s visit to China, Reagan issued a
directive stating that U.S. technology transfer to the PRC should support “a
secure, friendly, and modernized China” and established the so-called two-
times policy, thereby significantly broadening the “China Differential.” The
46. Cohen, America’s Response to China, p. 226.
47. On Haig’s meeting with Deng Xiaoping, see U.S. Embassy in China, “Meeting with Deng
Xiaoping,” Secret, Cable from Secretary of State Alexander Haig to President Ronald Reagan, 16 June
1981, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
48. U.S. Department of State, “Secretary’s Talking Points: U.S.-China Relations,” Secret, Talking
Points, 4 June 1981, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
49. U.S. Department of State, “End of Second Day Report—Beijing,” Secret, Cable from Secretary of
State Alexander Haig to Deputy Secretary of State William Clark, 16 June 1981, in NSArchive, China
and the United States. The cable incorporates the report sent by Haig to the President describing
Haig’s discussion with Huang Hua.
50. Ibid.; Solomon, U.S.-PRC Political Negotiations, p. 85; and U.S. Department of State, “Secretary’s
Talking Points.”
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United States would allow the approval of equipment and technology at
technical levels twice as high as those approved for the USSR before the in-
vasion of Afghanistan.51 The State Department subsequently removed China
from the list of countries denied licenses for arms exports.52 In September
1981, the President issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 11,
“Munitions/Technology Transfer to the People’s Republic of China,” which
stipulated that the case-by-case consideration of requests from the PRC for
military/technology transfers should be based on several principles. First, the
transfers should minimize the national security risks in the four key areas noted
earlier. Second, for requests that would enhance China’s conventional defen-
sive capabilities, the United States would be willing to consider the transfer of
weapons, components, technical assistance, and weapons technology, includ-
ing some licensed coproduction/involving non-sensitive technologies. Third,
the transfers should not contribute significantly to improvements in Chinese
offensive and power projection capabilities. Finally, requests for items that
were not clearly defensive would be permitted on a case-by-case basis through
the selective transfer of components and technical assistance rather than the
transfer of complete weapons systems or their production technology.53
The decisions taken in 1981 thus cumulatively loosened U.S. dual-use
export controls to the PRC and removed the ban on arms supplies to China.
However, these policies proved difficult to implement. A U.S. Commerce
Department study undertaken in 1982 at the request of Secretary of Com-
merce Malcolm Baldrige found that the “two-times” policy “was neither clear
nor predictable to the involved government agencies.” In fact “the two-times
benchmark was not easily applied across the Commodity Control List because
in certain areas nothing was allowed to go to the Soviet Union and therefore
[the government] had a little difficulty with two times nothing in terms of
how do you apply that in making licensing decisions.”54 In addition, contin-
ued divergences on Taiwan, particularly the issue of arms sales to the island,
complicated efforts to improve U.S.-PRC military relations. The Chinese au-
thorities said they were not interested in buying U.S. weapons unless the issue
51. Statement by William Archey, acting assistant secretary of commerce for trade administration, in
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade, Controls on Exports to the People’s Republic of China: Hearing, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 17 November 1983, p. 2.
52. Yuan, “The Politics of the Strategic Triangle,” p. 62.
53. White House, “Munitions/Technology Transfer to the People’s Republic of China,” National Secu-
rity Decision Directive (NSDD) 11, 22 September 1981, available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives.
54. Statement by William Archey, p. 2.
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of arms sales to Taipei could be settled in a satisfactory way.55 A Chinese
Foreign Ministry official declared that “we would rather receive no U.S. arms
than accept continued U.S. interference in our internal affairs by selling arms
to Taiwan.”56
By 1982, however, the U.S. government had taken two significant steps
to resolve the impasse on Taiwan. On 11 January 1982 the administration
announced its decision not to sell either version of the FX advanced fighter
to Taiwan (the F-16/J79 and the F-5G), but simply to renew the ten-year
agreement to coproduce with Taiwan the F-5E with Northrop Corporation.57
On 17 August, senior Chinese and U.S. officials reached an agreement on a
joint communique´ that would govern future U.S. arms sales to Taipei. The
Sino-American 1982 Joint Communique´ specified that the U.S. government
would not carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taipei, that U.S. arms
sales would not exceed the level of those supplied to Taipei since 1979 in either
qualitative or quantitative terms, and that the United States would gradually
reduce its arms exports to the island “leading over a period of time to a final
resolution.”58
The decision on the sale of the FX aircraft to Taiwan and the 1982
communique´, by temporarily easing tensions with Beijing on the Taiwan
problem, facilitated the strengthening of U.S.-China military cooperation.
Secretary of State George Shultz visited the PRC on 2–5 February 1983
and met, among others, Deng Xiaoping, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, and
Defense Minister Zhang Aiping. Zhao and Shultz discussed the key “problems
in our relationship, i.e. Taiwan and technology transfer.”59 Regarding arms
sales to the PRC, Shultz reiterated that the policy “announced by Secretary
Haig in June, 1981, has not changed: we are prepared to review any Chinese
55. Kerry Dumbaugh and Richard Grimmett, U.S. Arms Sales to China, Report 85-138 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, July 1985), p. 6.
56. Quoted in James Sterba, “The Shadow of Taiwan Follows Haig to Peking,” The New York Times,
11 June 1981.
57. For an analysis of the FX controversy, see Janice Hinton, The Sale of the FX Aircraft to Taiwan
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1982).
58. “United States-China Joint Communique´ on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan,” 17 August 1982,
available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives. Just after the announcement of the agreement,
however, to allay misgivings about the communique´, President Reagan issued a secret memorandum
clarifying that the volume and sophistication of U.S. arms exports to Taiwan would be contingent on
the balance of power across the Strait. See excerpts of the memorandum in Shirley Kan, China/Taiwan:
Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, CRS Report
for Congress RL30341 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 24 June 2011), p. 41.
59. U.S. Department of Defense, “China,” Secret, Origin [Deleted] Beijing, from Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Armitage to Secretary of Defense
Weinberger, 4 February 1983, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
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requests on the same case-by-case basis as for other friendly nations” and
added that “we don’t seek to press weapons, but would like to help where
we can, if you are interested.”60 Simultaneously, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Armitage met separately
with his counterparts in the PRC Ministry of Defense to address working-level
issues, such as concrete proposals for expansion of routine military-to-military
exchanges.61 The final session of the second day of Shultz’s visit was devoted
entirely to a discussion about technology transfers.62
The PRC as a Friendly Non-Allied Country and
the Broadening of the “China Differential”
In May 1983 the Reagan administration announced its decision to continue
to broaden Sino-American strategic cooperation by further liberalizing U.S.
export controls through the elevation of China into Country Group V and the
recognition of it as a “friendly, non-allied country” together with most other
“friendly countries.”63 Country Group V included Western Europe, India, all
of Africa except Libya, several Arab countries, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan.64 This group was subject to the most liberal export control regulations
among the existing Country Group categories (Z, S, Y, W, Q, T, V, plus the
former China-specific Group P established in 1980). The “China Differential”
relative to the Soviet Union thus continued to increase.
In conjunction with the shift of China into Group V, the president also
established an interagency steering group on technology transfers to the PRC
60. U.S. Department of State, “Your Meeting with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang,” Secret, Briefing
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz to
Secretary of State George Shultz, 27 January 1983, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
61. Ibid.
62. U.S. Department of Defense, “Asia Trip of SecState,” Secret, Cable from Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Armitage to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger,
3 February 1983, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
63. See U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Export Controls and China,” Gist, November 1989, pp. 1–4;
and Statement by Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, in U.S. Congress, House of Representa-
tives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Special Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China, U.S.
Technology Transfer to China: Hearing, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 27 September 1983, p. 4.
64. See U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Technology Transfer Policy toward China,” Letter
from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secret,
19 August 1983, in NSArchive, China and the United States; and Elizabeth Nimmo, “United States
Policy Regarding Technology Transfer to the People’s Republic of China,” Northwestern Journal of
International Law and Business, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1984), p. 262.
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under the direction of the NSC.65 Several committees were established, and
one, chaired by the Commerce Department, was responsible for compiling
new guidelines for U.S. export control policy toward China.66 In June 1983 the
NSC directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to prepare a report on the various
options for U.S. export control policy toward China.67 The following month,
the JCS issued its classified report, “Assessment of the Risks and Benefits in
the Transfer of Advanced Technology and Conventional Arms to China.”68
The report, now declassified, underscores the heterogeneous national security
interests that Washington balanced in assessing the desired extent of military
cooperation with Beijing. The JCS evaluated the consequences of various
export control policy options for China’s military capabilities and, in turn, for
U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, with the PRC, and with U.S. friends
and allies in East Asia. Looking at the likely impact of existing U.S. defense
technology transfers on the Sino-Soviet military balance in the 1980s, the
report stated that
the new decade will see China slightly improving its defensive capabilities against
a land invasion by the Soviet Union. . . . Still, the level of technology embodied
in new Chinese weapons will remain appreciably inferior to those of the Soviet
Union and will not significantly alter the military balance. In addition, it will take
some time, probably not until the mid-1990s, for China to absorb thoroughly
any technologies introduced in the 1980s. Chinese power projection capabilities
will not be significantly enhanced this decade and probably in the 1990s.69
As for the consequences of China defense modernization for U.S. and
allied interests in the Asia Pacific, the report stressed that the PLA’s “ground
force modernization will not appreciably affect U.S. and allied security inter-
ests through the 1990s” because China’s “air power projection is, for practical
purposes, limited to tactical fighter range” and “improvements in Chinese
naval capabilities are unlikely to have any significant impact on U.S. forces in
the region during the remainder of this century. . . . The threat to the United
65. Statement by Malcolm Baldrige, p. 5
66. Ibid.
67. Keyser, interview, 18 May 2010; and Henry Levine, interview, Washington, DC, 29 April 2010.
(Levine was economic affairs officer in the State Department’s Office of Chinese and Mongolian
Affairs, 1986–1988.) The JCS report is also mentioned by Secretary of Commerce Baldrige in a letter
to Secretary of Defense Weinberger. See U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Technology Transfer
Policy toward China.”
68. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Assessment of the Risks and Benefits in the Transfer of Advanced
Technology and Conventional Arms to China,” Secret, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
15 July 1983, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
69. Ibid., “Section I—Strategic Assessment,” pp. 23–24.
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States is further offset to the extent the U.S. can control the type and rate of
technology transferred and monitor improvements.”70 The JCS report there-
fore concluded that U.S. export controls could be liberalized. Nonetheless, “in
order to reduce the likelihood of China improving its military capabilities to a
level that would threaten U.S. interests, i.e. the Critical Military Capabilities,”
the JCS recommended a ban on technology exports in six “Special Mission Ar-
eas”: nuclear weapons and delivery systems, intelligence gathering, electronic
warfare, antisubmarine warfare, power projection, and air superiority.71 The
number of Special Mission Areas was therefore expanded from the four estab-
lished in 1981 to six in 1983. Stephen Bryen later explained that U.S. officials
had opposed the transfer of antisubmarine warfare capabilities to the PRC
because they did not want to “compromise key strategic programs: submarines
are a very big part of the nuclear triad, the whole notion of the triad is that
these submarines run silent, they are deep, they are stealthy, they are hidden,
and they cannot be targeted so that you have a credible nuclear deterrent.”
Bryen also stressed that “the U.S. had a particularly important advantage in
space, especially in satellites and intelligence gathering, and you did not want
to see that compromised. So a lot of the restrictions were focused on the
space part.”72 The administration thus concluded that “US technology trans-
fer should support China’s technological and economic modernization,” but
the new policy must “not alter the U.S.-PRC strategic balance, though the
transfer of technology will prevent a widening of the military gap between
the PRC and the USSR.”73 Here, too, the U.S. government needed to strike
a balance between competing security interests in assessing the desired degree
of defense cooperation with China.
The announced revisions to the Export Administration Regulations were
published in the Federal Register on 23 November 1983.74 The new guidelines
moved the PRC to Country Group V and established a three-tiered export
control system. This tiered system reflected Washington’s assessment of the
national security implications of technology exports in each category on U.S.
relations with the PRC, with the Soviet Union, and with U.S. allies and
friends in Asia. The “Green Zone” included seven commodity categories that
represented “minimal national security risk”—namely, computers, computer-
ized instruments, microcircuits, electronic instruments, recording equipment,
70. Ibid., pp. 24, 26, 37, 42.
71. Ibid., “Section III—Special Mission Areas,” pp. 1–7.
72. Ibid.
73. Statement by Malcolm Baldrige, p. 5.
74. McKenzie, “China and U.S. Trade,” p. 455.
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semiconductor production equipment, and oscilloscope technologies.75 Some
75 percent of all license applications for exports to China in 1983 fell in the
Green Zone’s seven categories, with computers accounting for 41 percent of all
license applications to China. The license applications for technologies within
this zone would receive expeditious consideration and routine approval by the
Commerce Department. The “Yellow Zone” included high-level technologies
and required case-by-case review by the Department of Commerce, the De-
partment of Defense, and other agencies. Licenses would be approved unless
the commodity or the technology could be demonstrated to prove a “clear
threat” to U.S. security interests.76 The “Red Zone” included the most sensi-
tive technology areas with direct and significant military applications; namely,
those falling in the six Special Mission Areas specified above.77 The content of
the Red Zone was classified and was not to be disclosed, and licenses for the
technologies in this zone had a “strong presumption of denial.”78
The decision in May 1983 to move China to the country group of most
“friendly countries” and the establishment of the three-tiered export control
system significantly liberalized U.S. high technology transfers to China, espe-
cially in electronics. Nevertheless, the new regulations did not bring export
controls toward China in line with those of non-Communist countries. Even
though exporters had been hoping for such a change after the May 1983 an-
nouncement, China continued to be the only country within Group V subject
to national security export controls.79 The Reagan administration continued
to require national security controls on exports to China and opposed the
removal of China from COCOM controls for two main reasons. First, the
administration wanted to maintain highly stringent controls on the most sen-
sitive technologies (i.e., those in the Yellow and, especially, the Red Zones)
that could enhance China’s offensive capabilities vis-a`-vis the United States
and its friends and allies. Second, in the context of U.S. efforts to counter the
Soviet Union, U.S. officials worried that COCOM partners would try to use
concessions on export controls to China as a means to obtain liberalization of
75. Statement by William Archey, p. 3.
76. Ibid., p. 4.
77. Bryen, interview.
78. Statement by William Archey, p. 5.
79. China’s frustration with the nonconformance of U.S. export controls among countries in Group
V, especially for items in the Yellow and Red Zones, was expressed by Premier Zhao during his visit in
the United States in 1984. See U.S. Department of State, “Secretary’s Meeting with Premier Zhao,”
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Secret, Memorandum to the U.S. Embassy in China, Secret,
January1984, in NSArchive, U.S. Intelligence and China.
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controls vis-a`-vis the USSR—a position contrary to the administration’s desire
to tighten national and multilateral export controls to the Soviet Union.80
When Reagan visited the PRC for the first time on 26–30 April 1984, he
told Chinese leaders he did “not believe that there is the necessary consensus
among our allies to drop China from COCOM nor do we believe that this
course is advisable from the standpoint of security.”81 He argued that the
“liberalization of export controls did not eliminate national security controls
or the need for coordination with our Allies. China has capabilities unlike those
of any other friendly, non-Allied country, particularly in nuclear weapons.”82
Nonetheless, the expansion of the “China Differential” that resulted from the
1983 liberalization of U.S. export controls continued apace in the following
years, as the Reagan administration both tightened controls on exports to the
USSR and increased technology transfers to the PRC.
The Reagan Administration’s Stance against the
USSR and Military Cooperation with China
U.S. export control policy toward China throughout the 1980s stands in
sharp contrast to the policy vis-a`-vis the Soviet Union and can be understood
only by reference to U.S. policies toward Moscow. As outlined in Reagan’s
Presidential Security Decision Directive (PSDD) 75, “U.S. Relations with
the USSR,” the administration’s goal was “to contain and over time reverse
Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the
Soviet Union in all international arenas—particularly in the overall military
balance. . . . This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the
USSR.”83 To do so, the United States, together with its COCOM allies,
adopted a two-pronged strategy aimed at maintaining a qualitative edge of
Western military equipment in the face of the Soviet Union’s quantitative
preponderance. This was to be done not only by investing in military research
and development and military production (leap ahead) but also by retaining
80. On the latter point, see ibid.
81. U.S. Department of State, “Your China Trip: Setting and Issues,” Secret, Memorandum from
Secretary of State George Shultz to President Ronald Reagan, 3 April 1984, in NSArchive, China and
the United States.
82. U.S. Department of State, “The Trip of President Reagan to the People’s Republic of China—
Talking Points,” Secret, ca. April 1984, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
83. The White House, “U.S. Relations with the USSR,” National Security Decision Directive 75, Top
Secret, 17 January 1983, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html.
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a national and multilateral system of stringent export controls (keep them
behind).
The first pillar of the administration’s anti-Soviet strategy was a trillion-
dollar defense buildup, the largest in peacetime history, including the procure-
ment of high-visibility systems such as the MX missile, the B-1B bomber, and
four new aircraft carriers, as well as the highly publicized launch of the Strategic
Defense Initiative in 1983.84 Concomitantly, the defense-related share of gov-
ernment spending on research and development grew substantially throughout
the 1980s, peaking in 1987 at almost 70 percent.85 The second pillar adopted
by the administration was the tightening of national and multilateral export
controls toward the USSR as a means to protect U.S. investments in advanced
defense technologies.86 PSDD 75 stressed that the United States wanted “to
ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military
buildup. This requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment
that would make a substantial contribution directly or indirectly to Soviet mil-
itary power.”87 Bryen later recalled the “paradigm” that shaped U.S. export
control policy toward the Soviet Union:
We tried to prevent the Soviet military from using Western technology in its
systems, taking note that the preponderance of technology that the Soviets needed
was electronics, computers, microelectronics, software—all the various elements
of electronics—and that spelled the difference between the Soviet military and
the American military. We called it quality edge. The thought was that while we
would not have as many tanks or airplanes, submarines or battleships—we would
never match the numbers that the Soviet Union was producing—ours would be
so much better and more capable, that electronics gave us a quality edge, a force
multiplier against whatever they could field.88
Paul Freedenberg, who served first as assistant secretary of commerce
for trade administration and then under secretary of commerce for export
administration in the latter half of the 1980s, recently described how the
United States adopted an undeclared policy throughout the 1980s aimed at
84. See Jacques Gansler, “Building Reform in Weapons Acquisition,” in William Snyder, James Brown,
eds., Defense Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,
1988), p. 367.
85. David Mowery, “Plus c¸a change: Industrial R&D in the ‘Third Industrial Revolution,’” Industrial
and Corporate Change, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2009), p. 30.
86. Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 267.
87. The White House, “U.S. Relations with the USSR,” 1983.
88. Bryen, interview.
23
Meijer
keeping the USSR one or two technological generations behind U.S. state-of-
the-art technologies:
We tried to keep them a generation or two behind. . . . It was an administration-
wide policy. . . . It was not a stated policy, but it was an unstated policy, it was
pretty clear. . . . There was no formal beginning to the policy. It became a rule of
thumb, based on what the Pentagon felt comfortable with, but you could trace
it to the very beginning of the Reagan Administration. . . . The rationale was
the same that guided the overall policy on technology transfer: keep the Soviets
substantially behind the West in technology, and there was likely to be a benefit
with regard to the diminished quality of Soviet weapons systems.89
The sharp bifurcation of U.S. export control policy toward Beijing and
Moscow, respectively, throughout the 1980s is highlighted by the fact that
the notion of “keeping them behind” one or two generations was applied
only to the Soviet Union, not to China.90 The combined application of the
“two generations behind” policy to the USSR and the simultaneous liberaliza-
tion of controls on defense and dual-use exports to the PRC resulted in the
steady expansion of the “China Differential” in favor of the PRC relative to
the Soviet Union. PSDD 75 emphasized that “China continues to support
U.S. efforts to strengthen the world’s defenses against Soviet expansionism.
The U.S. should over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and
policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of a Sino-Soviet
rapprochement.”91 Simultaneously, the administration embarked on a major
effort to tighten U.S. and multilateral export controls on trade with Warsaw
Pact countries. U.S. officials sought to expand the control list, bolster the
enforcement of controls, tighten the restrictions on scientific communication,
and reinforce COCOM’s institutional structure.92 As Michael Mastanduno
puts it, “by the latter half of the 1980s, it was evident that the multilateral
89. Paul Freedenberg, interview, Washington, DC, 9 March 2010; and Paul Freedenberg, interview,
Washington, DC, 22 August 2012. Freedenberg specified that this “unstated policy” “was applied
across the board when it was possible to ascertain what a particular generation of technology was (as in
the case of semiconductors). But sometimes it was impossible to make that judgment, and the answer
would be to endeavor to keep the Soviets behind whatever the U.S. and Western level of technology
was, even if it could not be quantified. . . . It was a rule of thumb. What is a generation? It is hard to
say. It just meant that we wanted to keep them far back from us rather than just merely behind us in
technology.” Ibid.
90. Freedenberg, interview, 22 August 2012.
91. The White House, “U.S. Relations with the USSR.”
92. Mastanduno, Economic Containment, pp. 233–241, 266–277.
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strategic embargo [on the Soviet bloc] was stronger than it had been during
the 1970s.”93
In line with this bifurcated approach to relations with Moscow and Beijing,
the Reagan administration continued to loosen defense and dual-use export
controls toward the PRC. When Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping was
visiting the United States from 9 to 27 June 1984, he and Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger signed a military technology cooperation agreement. On
12 July, the U.S. government decided to allow the PRC to receive government-
to-government military transfers by making China eligible for FMS, though
only on a cash basis.94 These sales provided China with a new channel, in
addition to dual-use technology imports and commercial arms sales, through
which it could acquire U.S. defense-related technology. In addition to arms
sales, the United States started cooperating with the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) in planning a Chinese National Defense University (NDU), similar to
the one in the United States. The PLA-NDU opened its doors on 1 September
1986, and maintained close ties with its U.S. counterpart throughout the
1980s, including regular exchanges of professors, rotating bilateral conferences,
exchanges of library texts and materials, field studies trips, and periodical
hosting of research fellows.95
COCOM’s Liberalizations and the Establishment
of the China Green Line
In 1985–1987, the United States and its COCOM partners markedly loosened
controls on exports to China. The liberalization of export controls on the PRC
in the early 1980s, coupled with the fact that exports to China were still subject
to COCOM review, had led to a dramatic growth in the number of license
applications for the PRC. Of the total U.S. license applications submitted
to COCOM, the China-related cases grew from approximately 54 percent
in 1982 to 95 percent in 1985. For those submitted by other COCOM
93. Ibid., p. 266.
94. The FMS program is the government-to-government method for selling U.S. defense equipment,
services, and training. In an FMS sale, the U.S. government, acting as a procurement agent, assists
with most aspects of the transaction, such as negotiating the nature and the price of equipment, as
well as providing subsequent service. See Dumbaugh and Grimmett, U.S. Arms Sales to China, p. 7;
and Ross, “China and the United States’ Export Controls System,” pp. 31–32.
95. Kerry Dumbaugh and Larry Nowels, China-U.S. Cooperation: Military Sales, Government Programs,
Multilateral Aid, and Private-Sector Activities, CRS Report for Congress 89-355, (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 1989), p. 4.
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Table 1. COCOM Exceptions Cases, 1983–1986
Cases 1983 1984 1985 1986
Total U.S. Cases 1,882 3,399 3,653 1,469
United States to China 1,502 2,931 3,498 1,271
% of Total U.S. Cases 80% 86% 96% 87%
Source: Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Trade Con-
trols Michael Zakaria, in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Technology
Transfers to China: Hearing, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 August 1987, p. 34.
members, the figures grew from 57 percent to 68 percent.96 The number of
cases submitted to COCOM expanded from 1,028 in 1982 to 4,611 in 1985,
which led a backlog of roughly 1,000 China cases in 1984–1985.97 In 1985,
the U.S. government requested 3,653 exceptions to COCOM, 96 percent of
which were for China (see Table 1).98
On 27 December 1985, after ten months of negotiations, the backlog of
China cases in COCOM spurred the member-states to agree to liberalize the
controls on certain products destined for China.99 The proposal had been for-
mally submitted to COCOM by the U.S. government in early 1985. The new
guidelines divided the controlled categories on COCOM’s International In-
dustrial List into three groups, each with specific technical parameters, replicat-
ing what the U.S. government had done in 1983 with the creation of the Green,
Yellow, and Red Zones.100 The first group covered 27 product categories that
fell under COCOM’s new China “Green Line.” Items in these 27 categories
could be exported to China at “national discretion,” without referring the ex-
port license application to COCOM for prior approval. The 27 categories con-
sisted mainly of computers, software, instrumentation, telecommunications
96. Yuan, “The Politics of the Strategic Triangle,” p. 66.
97. Ibid.
98. Statement by Michael Zacharia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Trade Con-
trols, 1987, in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Technology Transfers to China: Hearing, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., 3 August 1987, p. 34.
99. Ross, “China and the United States’ Export Controls System,” p. 31. On the U.S. government’s
concerns over the backlog of China-applications, see the statement by Robert Price, Director of the
State Department’s Office of East-West Trade, in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, U.S. and Multilateral
Export Controls: Hearing, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 April 1985, pp. 8–9.
100. Yuan, “The Politics of the Strategic Triangle,” p. 66.
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equipment, and semiconductor manufacturing.101 The items included in the
second group were at an intermediate level of technology and required monthly
statistical reports to COCOM. Items in the third group, which essentially
encompassed the six Special Mission Areas (mentioned above), required com-
pulsory referral to COCOM and carried a presumption of denial.102 The U.S.
government maintained tight controls on these categories because it did not
want to “encourage or support Chinese advances” in military technologies
“as they relate to increased offensive military capabilities” vis-a`-vis the United
States and its partners and allies.103 Having established the three groups, CO-
COM then further liberalized export controls to China in 1986–1987. The
additional revisions included adding five categories to the China Green Zone
and liberalizing the technical parameters for ten existing categories. By April
1987, the Green Zone had expanded to 32 categories from only seven cate-
gories in 1983.104 The following month, COCOM also liberalized munitions
exports to China for thirteen more categories.105
The rationale for maintaining stringent restrictions on exports for some
technology categories while considerably liberalizing controls on others was
the conflicting nature of U.S. security interests vis-a`-vis China. A formerly
secret State Department memorandum from 1986 highlights the point:
US export control policy toward China is designed to balance our desire to
support China’s economic modernization with the need to assess the potential
adverse effects on the security interests of the U.S. and of our allies. Specifically,
our policy is aimed at limiting exports that would make a key contribution to
identifiable Chinese military programs in [these] 6 critical mission areas, in a
manner that would threaten U.S. national security interests.106
U.S. officials were willing to increase defense technology exports to and co-
operation with China, but only if the exports did not endanger U.S. security
interests or the security of U.S. allies and friends.
101. For more details on these categories, see Ross, “China and the United States’ Export Controls
System,” p. 31.
102. Yuan, “The Politics of the Strategic Triangle,” p. 67.; and U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy
Toward China,” Secret, Statement, 30 July 1986, in NSArchive, China and the United States, p. 3.
103. U.S. Department of State, “Transfer of Military Equipment to China (COCOM Aspect),”
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Confidential, Testimony—Response to Questions Submitted
by Congress, 30 July 1986, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
104. Yuan, “The Politics of the Strategic Triangle,” pp. 57, 67.
105. These categories included small arms and machine guns, large caliber armaments, ammunition,
bombs, torpedoes, and rockets; tanks, vehicles, and special armored equipment; defensive equipment
for use against toxicological agents; naval vessels and special naval equipment; aircraft and helicopters;
and military infrared and thermal-imaging equipment. Ibid., p. 67.
106. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy toward China,” p. 3.
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Linkage: China’s Missile Proliferation and U.S.
Defense Technology Transfers
In late 1987, after several years of a steady, albeit calibrated, increase in U.S.
technology transfers to the PRC, the Reagan administration decided that
it would temporarily freeze the liberalization of export controls because of
China’s missile proliferation practices in the Middle East, especially the sale of
Chinese-made HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran and of CSS-2 inter-
mediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. decision
to link bilateral military cooperation to China’s proliferation behavior under-
scored the tradeoff between U.S. nonproliferation interests and the desire to
enhance strategic cooperation with China. Nonproliferation concerns limited
the degree of U.S.-PRC military cooperation, bringing to a temporary halt
U.S. defense exports to the PRC. The Reagan administration began using the
prospects of continued military cooperation as a foreign policy instrument
aimed at modifying China’s proliferation practices.
On 22 October 1987, the U.S. State Department announced that it would
refrain from additional liberalization of technology transfers to the PRC be-
cause of the “rising tensions in the Persian Gulf,” adding “we consider this
an inappropriate time to proceed with our review of further export control
liberalization.”107 Earlier in 1987 the United States had begun to reflag and
escort Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf.108 The decision to halt further
liberalization of export controls followed several attacks by Iran with Silk-
worm missiles on oil tankers in Kuwaiti waters, including several owned by a
U.S. company or flying a U.S. flag.109 According to a U.S. intelligence report
dated 15 October 1987, the Liberian-flagged tanker Sungari, which was be-
ing escorted by U.S. naval vessels, was hit at anchor eight miles off Kuwait’s
al-Ahmadi oil terminal by an Iranian Silkworm missile, setting it afire from
stem to stern.110 On 16 October, the Sea Isle City, a U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti
oil tanker, was also hit by a Silkworm missile that wounded eighteen crew
members.111 Declassified State Department documents indicate that the U.S.
107. Molly Moore and David Ottaway, “U.S. Reacts to China’s Silkworm Sale; Technology Transfer
Delayed,” The Washington Post, 23 October 1987.
108. Woon, “Chinese Arms Sales and U.S.-China Military Relations,” p. 603.
109. Moore and Ottaway, “U.S. Reacts to China’s Silkworm Sale.”
110. U.S. Department of State, “Persian Gulf: Fourth Time Lucky for Iranian Silkworms at Kuwait,”
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Secret, Intelligence Report, 15 October 1987, in NSArchive,
China and the United States.
111. “Ship Flying U.S. Flag Hit; 18 Wounded,” St. Petersburg Times (Florida), 17 October 1987.
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government was concerned by the adverse consequences of Chinese missile
exports to Iran on U.S. shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, on the Iran-Iraq
War, and on the overall stability of the Middle East.112 During visits to China
in July and September 1988, Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense
Frank Carlucci reiterated their concerns over the potentially destabilizing con-
sequences of China’s arms exports, “especially to volatile regions such as the
Middle East.”113 The administration decided to make the further liberalization
of U.S. export controls dependent on China’s proliferation practices. Although
U.S. officials provided “assurances about continued long-term U.S. support
for China’s modernization,” they told their Chinese counterparts that “the
presence of Chinese-made weapons in the Gulf [has] seriously undermined
political support in Congress and the Administration for further relaxation
of restrictions on technology transfers to China. For PRC policymakers, the
linkage between tech transfer and arms sales is clear and unambiguous.”114
When Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian visited the United States in
March 1988, he offered private assurances that China would impose a “mora-
torium on deliveries of anti-ship missiles to Iran.”115 By agreeing to end the
sale of Silkworm missiles to Iran and to prevent the diversion of such missiles
from third countries such as North Korea, the Chinese hoped to gain renewed
liberalization of U.S. export controls.116 In exchange, U.S. officials announced
the resumption of the export control liberalization. By May 1988 the State
Department considered that “to date, steps PRC has taken to ensure that
additional Chinese anti-ship missiles do not reach Iran have been effective.”117
112. For details, see U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Arms Trade with Iran,” Secret, Cable to
the U.S. Embassy in China, 21 May 1987, in NSArchive, China and the United States; and U.S.
Department of State, “Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East,” Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Talking Points, Secret, 2 May 1988, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
113. U.S. Department of State, “Ballistic Missiles/Arms Sales by the PRC,” Classification Unknown,
Talking Points, ca. September 1988, in NSArchive, China and the United States. This document,
although dated approximately September 1988, is more likely to have been written in 1989 given that
it refers to Shultz’s and Carlucci’s visits “last year” to the PRC.
114. U.S. Embassy in Beijing, “Background Statement on U.S. Export Control Policy toward China,”
Confidential, Cable to the State Department, 18 December 1987, in NSArchive, China and the United
States. See also U.S. Department of State, “Export Control Liberalization for China,” Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Classification Unknown, Press Guidance, 23 October 1987, in NSArchive,
China and the United States.
115. U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East,” 1988.
116. Bates Gill, “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Dynamics of Chinese Nonproliferation and
Arms Control Policy-Making in an Era of Reform,” in David Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese
Foreign and Security Policy in an Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 268.
117. U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East.”
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A further source of proliferation concern for the administration came
in 1988 when U.S. intelligence learned that the Chinese had transferred
CSS-2 (or Dong Feng 3, DF-3) missiles to Saudi Arabia.118 U.S. officials were
concerned that “the sale of CSS-2 IRBMs to Saudi Arabia is the first export
of a missile with this range (up to 3,000 km) to the Third World.”119 The
sales provided Saudi Arabia with the longest-range missile systems deployed
by any country other than the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council. The details of the CSS-2 contract were negotiated in Hong Kong in
December 1986 by Saudi and Chinese senior military officials.120 According
to JCS reports, the missiles were delivered in the latter half of 1987, and at
the end of January 1988 China started assisting Saudi Arabia in constructing
CSS-2 launch sites.121 During Wu’s visit to the United States in March 1988,
U.S. officials pressed him on the CSS-2 deal. The Chinese foreign minister
responded that the CSS-2 missiles had been modified and were not nuclear-
capable.122 However, U.S. State Department officials’ concerns were not allayed
by China’s assurances, and the administration believed there was “a danger to
international stability inherent in continued sales of missile technology and
missile delivery systems” to the Middle East.123 A few weeks later, Secretary of
State Shultz wrote a private letter to Wu emphasizing U.S. concerns “both with
the implications which Chinese missile transfers have for peace and stability
in the region and for the broader implications for international stability of
transfers of this class of weapons.”124
An agreement was finally reached in September 1987 during Carlucci’s
visit to China. A declassified State Department document indicates that Chi-
nese leaders gave private assurances to Carlucci that China would “take a
prudent and responsible attitude regarding weapons sales, including the sale
118. Evan Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices,
1980–2004 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 104.
119. U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East.”
120. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint, pp. 104, 106.
121. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “[Excised] Export of the CSS-2 to Saudi Arabia,” Classification
Unknown, Intelligence Information, 29 April 1988, in NSArchive, China and the United States;
and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “[Excised] Export of the Improved Dongfang 3S to Saudi Arabia,”
Classification Unknown, Intelligence Information Report, 28 June 1988, in NSArchive, China and
the United States.
122. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint, p. 107.
123. U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East.”
124. U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Missile Transfers to Saudi Arabia,” Secret, Testimony, 20
April 1988, in NSArchive, China and the United States. See also U.S. Department of State, “Chinese
Sale of Missiles to Saudi Arabia: Letter to PRC Foreign Minister,” Secret, Action Memorandum, 26
March 1988, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
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of missiles.”125 After the meetings with Chinese leaders, Carlucci stated that
he was “fully satisfied with their statements that China takes a prudent ap-
proach to arms sales.”126 He added, “these had been the best discussions that
we have had with the Chinese on this issue.”127 In the Great Hall of the Peo-
ple, Deng and Carlucci also discussed the prospects for the launch of U.S.
satellites on China’s Long March launchers.128 The day after Deng gave his
assurances to Carlucci, the Reagan administration announced it would grant
export licenses for satellites manufactured by Hughes Aircraft and scheduled
to be launched for Australian and Hong Kong companies on China’s Long
March launchers. The Hong Kong–based AsiaSat was to put a satellite in
orbit in 1989, and AusSat from Australia would launch two satellites using
the Chinese service in 1991 and 1992.129 Lincoln Bloomfield, who, as a senior
Department of Defense official, was part of the U.S. delegation with Carlucci,
Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, and U.S. Ambassador to
the PRC Winston Lord, later outlined the rationale behind the agreement to
launch U.S.-made satellites on Long March vehicles. Bloomfield contended
that after the 1986 explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger, the United States
could not make many launches per year and therefore had “a strategic gap,
we did not have launch services.” This gap created an incentive to seek access
to the Chinese launchers. In addition, the U.S. government “had a strategic
desire to persuade China not to proliferate missiles to the Middle East.” The
agreement was also symbolically important in highlighting the expansion of
Sino-American security and economic cooperation.130
The final attempt of the decade to liberalize defense technology transfers
to the PRC was made in 1988/early 1989, prior to the Tiananmen Square
125. U.S. Department of State, “Ballistic Missiles/Arms Sales by the PRC.” Another secret briefing
paper compiled by the State Department indicates that Deng Xiaoping told Frank Carlucci that “except
for Saudi Arabia, China will not provide intermediate missiles to any country.” See U.S. Department
of State, “President’s Meeting with Yang Shangkun,” Secret, Briefing Paper, 8 February 1989, available
at http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB; emphasis added.
126. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Missile Proliferation,” Classification Unknown,
Testimony, ca. September 1988, in NSArchive, China and the United States (the quoted sentence is
handwritten on the document).
127. U.S. Department of State, “Background on Chinese Missile Sales,” Secret, Cable, 29 September
1988, in NSArchive, China and the United States.
128. Lincoln Bloomfield, interview, Washington, DC, 4 October 2010. Bloomfield was principal
deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (1988–1989).
129. Jim Abrams, “Agreement on Missiles, Satellites Highlight Carlucci Visit,” Associated Press, 10
September 1988.
130. Bloomfield, interview. For details on the establishment of the U.S.-China space cooperation
agreement, see Hugo Meijer, Trading with the Enemy: The Making of U.S. Export Control Policy
toward the People’s Republic of China, Ph.D. Diss., Institut d’E´tudes Politiques, Sciences Po, Paris,
2013, ch. II.2.
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crackdown in June. Christopher Hankin, deputy assistant secretary of state for
international trade controls (1988–1994) and a lead negotiator for the U.S.
government in COCOM, explains that the United States made a proposal to
COCOM for the establishment of a “China Core List” that would have further
reduced the scope of multilateral export controls, thereby liberalizing controls
beyond the existing “China Differential.” COCOM’s executive committee
agreed to work on such a proposal in October 1988. The proposal was then
endorsed during the January 1989 COCOM’s high-level meeting. In July of
that year, however, when the People’s Liberation Army violently quelled the
peaceful mass demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, the U.S. proposal to
COCOM was dropped.131
Characterizing U.S. Dual-Use and Weapons
Exports to China in the 1980s
The analysis presented here has shown how U.S.-PRC military relations
steadily deepened during the last decade of the Cold War. As a consequence of
the successive liberalizations of U.S. export controls, U.S. exports of arms and
dual-use technologies grew in volume and sophistication. Meticulous scrutiny
of the content of U.S.-PRC military cooperation brings to light the key trends
that characterized U.S. arms sales and dual-use exports to China and thereby
enriches the understanding of the factors that shaped Sino-American military
cooperation in the last decade of the Cold War.
U.S. exports of advanced technology to China rose from $630 million in
1982 to $1.7 billion in 1988 (see Table 2). During the same period, the value
of U.S. export licenses approved for China grew from $500 million to $2.9
billion (see Table 3). In just the first half of the 1980s, from 1982 to 1986,
U.S. exports of telecommunications equipment to the PRC grew by nearly
300 percent, reaching $66 million; exports of precision instruments grew by
400 percent to $257 million; and exports of computers grew by more than
1,200 percent to $194 million. Consequently, as stressed by Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Commerce Melvin Searls in 1987, the United States “captured a
substantial portion of the Chinese market in many high technology areas.” U.S.
firms supplied 53 percent of China’s total imports of computers and related
equipment and 47 percent of China’s measuring and controlling equipment
imports. In 1986, computers, aircraft, precision instruments, electronic circuit
manufacturing, and telecommunications equipment made up approximately
131. Christopher Hankin, interview, Washington, DC, 1 December 2010.
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Table 2. U.S. Advanced Technology
Exports to China, 1982–1988
Year Total Value in $ Billion
1982 $0.63
1983 $0.65
1984 $0.82
1985 $1.71
1986 $1.28
1987 $1.43
1988 $1.72
Source: U.S. Department of State, “US Export Con-
trols and China,” Gist, November 1989, p. 7.
Table 3. U.S. Export Licenses Approved
for China, 1982–1988
Year
Number of
Applications
Total Dollar
Value (billion)
1982 2,020 $0.5
1983 2,834 $0.9
1984 4,443 $2.0
1985 8,637 $5.5
1986 6,157 $3.4
1987 5,777 $2.3
1988 5,724 $2.9
Source: U.S. Department of State, “US Export Controls
and China,” Gist, November 1989, p. 7.
80 percent of the total value of all approved individual validated export licenses
for China.132 Electronics as a percentage of total U.S. exports to China rose
from 3 percent in 1980 to 12 percent in 1988 (with a peak of 23 percent
in 1986).133 By 1988, the United States allowed the sales of computers ten
132. Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce Melvin Searls, in U.S. Congress, House
of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gations, Technology Transfer to China: Hearing, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 August 1987, p. 27.
133. Harding, A Fragile Relationship, Appendix A, Table A-4: Commodity Composition of U.S.
Exports to China, 1971–1990, p. 366.
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Table 4. Licenses and License Values of U.S. Com-
mercial Arms Transfers to China, 1982–1986
Fiscal Year
Licenses
Issued (no.)
License Value
(in $ thousand)
1982 28 185
1983 47 71.459
1984 109 82.994
1985 154 286.418
1986 163 79.527
Total 501 520.583
Source: Henri Kenny, “Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales
to China,” in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers—1986 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 64.
times more powerful to the PRC than to the USSR.134 Dual-use information
technology thus loomed large in overall U.S. technology transfers to China in
the 1980s.
Arms sales to the PRC also grew throughout the decade as a result of
the relaxation of U.S. export controls. By the late 1980s, significant weapons
purchases by the PRC, through both commercial arms transfers and FMS, in-
cluded: 24 Sikorsky S-70 helicopters, 5 General Electric LM-2500 gas turbine
engines for two naval destroyers, 6 Boeing Chinook helicopters, AN/TPQ-37
artillery-locating radars, avionics equipment to modernize 50 F-8 intercep-
tor aircraft (the so-called Peace Pearl program), Hughes I-TOW anti-tank
and I-Hawk anti-air missiles, Mark-46 Mod 2 anti-submarine warfare torpe-
does, Phalanx close-in weapons systems, and the Large Caliber-Ammunition
Modernization program.135 Nonetheless, a characteristic of U.S.-China arms
transfers in the 1980s is that, overall, the PRC preferred to acquire technology
rather than large quantities of weapons systems. The majority of the more than
500 licenses for commercial exports from 1982 through 1986 (see Table 4)
134. Statement by Eugene McAllister, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs,
in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, The
Administration’s Decision to License the Chinese Long March Launch Vehicle: Hearing, 100th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 23 and 27 September 1988, p. 2.
135. This list is based upon Dumbaugh and Nowels, China-U.S. Cooperation; Shirley Kan, U.S.-
China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress RL32496 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 2009); Kenny, “Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to
China”; Ross, “China and the United States’ Export Controls System”; Woon, “Chinese Arms Sales
and U.S.-China Military Relations”; and Yuan, “The Politics of the Strategic Triangle.”
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involved the transfer of technical data, components of combat or combat
support equipment, or a single item or a few items. Large-quantity purchases
of sophisticated weaponry were fewer.136 A declassified 1985 report produced
by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on China’s imports of foreign
technology explains that although the training of Chinese students abroad and
the improvement of Chinese science through cooperation and exchanges with
foreign countries had a major long-term effect, the more immediate and short-
term improvements in the 1980s were the result of commercial transactions,
including purchases from foreign corporations, joint ventures, and consulting
and industrial training.137 The report further stresses that
China’s present policy is to maximize the flow of foreign technology. . . . China
tries to import only what it cannot produce for itself and to limit imports to
advanced technology and key equipment. In general the plan is to import technol-
ogy that is as advanced as possible, yet still suitable to Chinese conditions. . . . The
emphasis is on raising the technical level of existing enterprises rather than im-
porting complete plants or equipment. . . . Whenever possible, China will at-
tempt to acquire technology and know-how rather than finished products.138
Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 5, the overwhelming majority of U.S. arms
deliveries to China were commercial, although government-to-government
sales grew after 1984, when China became eligible for FMS. The overall vol-
ume of U.S. arms transfers to the PRC remained relatively small throughout
the 1980s, with a total of approximately $106 million in 1989 (see Table 5).
The limited amount of U.S. arms shipments to China was partly attributable
to the U.S. government’s desire to restrict sales of critical military technologies
that could adversely affect U.S. security interests in Asia or U.S. relations with
Moscow. In addition, this relatively small volume can be attributed to several
factors. Major financial constraints circumscribed the ability of the PRC to
purchase expensive weapons systems. In the aftermath of the Cultural Revo-
lution and after the disastrous border war with Vietnam in 1979, the PLA’s
serious deficiencies had become all too evident, prompting Deng to decry
it as a bloated and inefficient force.139 Furthermore, throughout the 1980s,
defense modernization ranked fourth in priority in China’s “four moderniza-
tions” program, after the development of agriculture, industry, and science
136. Kenny, “Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China,” p. 63.
137. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China’s Import of Foreign Technology, Survey and Chronology: 1
January–31 December, Classification Unknown, Defense Intelligence Estimate, August 1985, p. 2.
138. Ibid.
139. Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 54–55.
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Table 5. U.S. Arms Deliveries to the PRC, 1981–1990 (thousands
of current U.S. dollars)
Fiscal Year
Commercial
Deliveries
Government-to-
Government Deliveries Total
1981 0 Not eligible 0
1982 1,000 Not eligible 1,000
1983 209 Not eligible 209
1984 8,037 6 8,043
1985 46,247 424 46,671
1986 55,243 547 55,790
1987 33,933 3,881 37,814
1988 48,891 39,122 88,013
1989 16,415 89,800 106,215
1990 3,615 0 3,615
Source: Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Wash-
ington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1992), Appendix 11-A (based on the annual reports
of the U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Con-
struction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts).
and technology. As a result, China’s defense expenditures shrank considerably
in the late 1970s and 1980s. The army’s share of the national budget declined
from 17.5 percent (22.3 billion yuan) in 1979 to 8.3 percent (20.4 billion
yuan) by 1987, representing an average 7 percent annual decrease.140 The U.S.
congressional Office of Technology Assessment issued a report in 1987 that
acknowledged China “cannot afford to buy many weapons systems. Acquiring
modern weapons would be the fastest way to a modernized military, but China
does not feel the need to be pressing enough to sacrifice its economic priorities.
Instead, it prefers to import technology rather than equipment.”141
When purchasing weapons, China often focused on lower-cost U.S. excess
military equipment. Andrew Semmel, who helped to oversee FMS programs
when working for the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) from 1981
to 1985, later recalled that “the thing that really caught their eye was the
fact that the U.S. had a lot of excess military equipment that was no longer
necessary to fill out our combat inventories and that these items were generally
140. Tai Ming Cheung, “Disarmament and Development in China: The Relationship between Na-
tional Defense and Economic Development,” Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 7 (1988), p. 771.
141. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Transfer to China, OTA-ISC-340
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1987), p. 10.
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available for sale and transfers at usually reduced prices. The Chinese were
very interested because it was basically a discount price that they could get.”142
China’s limited ability to absorb advanced technologies also constrained the
type and volume of its imports of advanced technology. According to the DIA,
China’s ability to assimilate technology is limited by such factors as shortage
of skilled manpower, inadequate management, an economic structure marked
by a high degree of compartmentalization and duplication, and a low degree of
exchange between enterprises. . . . Diffusion of knowledge between enterprises is
very rare. The absence of standardization within and between enterprises hinders
the integration of up-to-date imported technology.143
China’s struggle between, on the one hand, greater exchanges with the West to
acquire advanced technologies and, on the other hand, the maintenance of a
degree of self-reliance to avoid becoming overly dependent on foreign sources
of technology was a further factor constraining China’s weapons imports.144
As a consequence of the multiple and competing considerations that
shaped U.S. military relations with China, coupled with the PRC’s domestic
constraints, the key trends that characterized the bilateral strategic coopera-
tion in the 1980s were bilateral strategic cooperation in the 1980s, rapidly
expanding sales of dual-use technologies, increasingly frequent military visits,
and a relatively limited volume of arms sales.145
Tiananmen Square and the Demise of U.S.-China
Military Cooperation
U.S.-China military cooperation ended abruptly in the aftermath of the PLA’s
brutal crackdown on peaceful student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square
in June 1989 and the subsequent imposition of U.S. sanctions. On 5 June,
to express U.S. condemnation of the PRC’s actions, the Bush administra-
tion imposed an initial series of sanctions including the suspension of arms
sales to the PRC and the postponement of all high-level military-to-military
contacts.146 The moratorium on arms sales to China affected several major
142. Andrew Semmel, interview, Washington, DC, 24 November 2010. The DSAA was later renamed
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
143. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China’s Import of Foreign Technology, p. 4.
144. Kenny, “Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China,” p. 64.
145. On this point, see also U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Transfer to
China, p. 173.
146. Dianne Rennack, China: U.S. Economic Sanctions, Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress 96-272 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 October 1997), p. 16.
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FMS programs.147 On 20 June, a second set of sanctions was announced,
including postponement of all further lending to China by international fi-
nancial institutions and suspension of all official exchanges above the level of
assistant secretary. Members of Congress from across the political spectrum
called for the imposition of harsher penalties. A battle ensued between the
executive branch and Congress. Both Democrats and Republicans criticized
the administration for being too cautious, and bipartisan support for tougher
measures against the PRC increased.148 The administration attempted to resist
congressional pressure and to maintain open communication channels with
Beijing to avoid jeopardizing long-term U.S. strategic interests.149 President
Bush sent National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary
of State Lawrence Eagleburger on a secret trip to China to meet with Chi-
nese leaders to express U.S. disapproval of the Tiananmen crackdown but
also to convey the president’s firm desire to avert a profound deterioration of
U.S.-China relations.150
Congress passed a comprehensive sanctions amendment to the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years (FY) 1990 and 1991, introduced
on 21 November 1989 and signed by Bush on 16 February 1990. The amend-
ment required the administration to continue the suspension of munitions
and crime control equipment exports to China, as well as exports of U.S.
satellites intended for launch by a Chinese launch vehicle unless the president
reported to Congress that it was in U.S. national security interests to terminate
such a suspension. The amendment also required the suspension of licenses
147. The affected programs included the $27.34 million Large Caliber Ammunition Modernization
Program; the $60.87 million sale of four AN/TPO-27 “Firefinder” radars, support equipment, and
training; the $8.6 million sale of four Mk46-MOD 2 torpedoes, support equipment, spares, and
training; and the $50.2 million F-8 Peace Pearl modernization program to develop, test, and produce
55 upgrade fire control system kits and deliver them to the PRC to install in its F-8 aircraft. See U.S.
Department of State, “U.S. Sanctions against China,” Secret, Background Paper, ca. October 1993,
in NSArchive, China and the United States. By 1989, production on the Peace Pearl program had
not begun and, because of major cost overruns, China decided to terminate the project. See Thomas
Wilborn, Security Cooperation with China: Analysis and a Proposal, SSI Monographs (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 1994), p. 7.
148. Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 226, 230–234. See also David Skidmore and William
Gates, “After Tiananmen: The Struggle over U.S. Policy Toward China in the Bush Administration,”
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for export to China of goods or technology that could be used for nuclear ex-
plosive purposes unless the president certified that China was not assisting any
non-nuclear country to acquire nuclear explosive devices or materials.151 The
legislation further stipulated that the president should arrange with govern-
ments participating in COCOM to suspend any liberalization and to oppose
any further liberalization of controls on exports of goods and technology
to China.152 The Tiananmen sanctions, by imposing an arms embargo and
stringent restrictions on dual-use trade with the PRC, reflected the sharpest
deterioration of Sino-American ties since the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions a decade earlier and brought to an end U.S.-China military cooperation.
Conclusions
In the last decade of the Cold War, U.S. export control policy toward Bei-
jing and Moscow bifurcated. On the one hand, the United States adopted
a two-pronged strategy (the so-called “leap ahead” and “keep them behind”
approach) aimed at maintaining a U.S. qualitative edge in advanced defense
technology in the face of Soviet quantitative superiority. Major investments
in defense research and development, coupled with the tightening of national
and multilateral export controls, were intended to keep the USSR two gen-
erations behind U.S. state-of-the-art technology. On the other hand, in the
context of the strategic triangle, the United States consistently increased the
volume and sophistication of defense and dual-use transfers to the PRC to
strengthen China’s defenses against a Soviet attack, to gain greater leverage
in U.S. relations with the USSR, and to induce restraint in Moscow’s for-
eign policy. The U.S. government adopted the “two-times” policy (i.e., the
transfer to China of technology twice as sophisticated as that exported to the
Soviet Union) and then established the Green Zone to facilitate the routine
approval of defense-related exports to China. Subsequently, the United States
allowed commercial and then government-to-government arms sales to the
PRC; pressed for and obtained the liberalization of COCOM multilateral
controls; and even attempted to establish a “China Core List” in COCOM
just a few months before the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. These
decisions steadily widened the “China Differential,” a differential that, unlike
in the 1950s (when China received harsher treatment), entailed preferential
export control treatment for China in comparison to the Soviet Union.
151. This point refers to the prospects of U.S. civilian nuclear exports to the PRC, envisaged by
the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement signed in 1985 (but implemented only in 1998 after
President Bill Clinton signed the required certifications on China’s nuclear nonproliferation behavior).
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Throughout the decade, U.S. defense-related exports to China expanded
significantly. However, on the basis of declassified documents and first-hand
testimony, this article has shown that the degree of U.S.-China military
cooperation did not simply reflect Washington’s desire to use the “China card”
against Moscow. Bilateral cooperation was contingent on and partially con-
strained by the PRC’s limited ability to acquire and absorb advanced weapons
systems. Moreover, the United States faced subtle tradeoffs because it needed
to balance heterogeneous and conflicting national security interests in defense
technology transfers to the PRC, something that has been largely slighted in
the existing literature.
Despite the growth of U.S.-China military cooperation vis-a`-vis the Soviet
Union, Washington carefully hedged and calibrated its defense technology
exports to avoid bolstering China’s offensive capabilities vis-a`-vis the United
States and its friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region and to avoid damaging
U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations. This is why the U.S. government established
the Yellow and Red Zones and continued to prevent the export of what
it defined as Critical Military Capabilities—namely, the technologies falling
into Special Mission Areas. These areas were even expanded from four to six in
1983 (and then included in the Red Zone) to cover power projection and air
superiority along with the earlier categories of nuclear weapons and delivery
systems, intelligence gathering, electronic warfare, and anti-submarine warfare.
Furthermore, when U.S. interests were threatened by China’s proliferation
behavior in the Middle East, Washington adopted a carrot-and-stick approach
and explicitly linked further military cooperation to Beijing’s proliferation
behavior. Accordingly, nonproliferation interests also loomed large in the U.S.
decision-making process. The range of national security considerations that
shaped U.S. military relations with the PRC was therefore more complex,
more heterogeneous, and broader than merely enhancing China’s military
capabilities vis-a`-vis the Soviet Union.
This unprecedented era of U.S.-PRC military cooperation came to an
abrupt end in June 1989. As Robert Suettinger puts it, the Tiananmen crack-
down and the subsequent U.S. sanctions “dealt an enormous setback to bilat-
eral relations between the United States and China—a setback from which, in
some ways, they have never recovered.”153
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